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Abstrnct 
The present experiment was designed to study the effect of 
the variables of ~ naivete concerning psychological experimenta-
tion, the use of deception, and level of trust on a ~·s ability 
to become demand aware. It was hypothesized that the demand 
awareness of high and low trust ~s would be differentially 
affected by their level of knowledge about psychological experi-
mentation, and by the type of explanation given to them (none, 
honest, deceptive) as to the purpose of the experiment. Non-
significant results indicated no support for this hypothesis. 
Difficulties with the subjective aspect of the demand awareness 
measure used are discussed in relation to their possible effect 
upon the reliability and validity of the measure. 
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Introduction 
Orne (1962, 1973) has thoroughly discussed the concept of 
de~and characteristics and their importance in the experimental 
situation. He has proposed that Es consider their Ss as active 
problem solvers rather than passive responaers. With these new 
conceptualizations have come numerous studies of the effects of 
demand characteristics on experimental results, but few of these 
studies have dealt with the variables which affect a S's ability 
to perceive the demand cues. 
Orne (1962, p. 779) defines demand characteristics as "the 
totality of cues which convey an experimental hypothesis to the 
subject." Page and Scheidt suggest that a more "operational-
izable" concept is that of demand awareness --- "the perceptual 
or cognitive aspects of the subject's conciusions from the 
experimental situation regarding what is expected of him" (1971, 
p. 304). It is important to note the difference between these 
two concepts. Demand characteristics are the situational cues 
as to what the E's hypothesis is. Demand awareness is the S's 
conclusions, based upon his perception of these demand cues, as 
to what the ~'s hypothesis is and as to what behaviors will 
validate this hypothesis. When a ~ accurately perceives what 
the E's hypothesis is, he is said to be demand aware. 
In order to determine how demand characteristics and demand 
awareness affect the results of an experiment, psychologists have 
focused their studies on determining what a ~'s response will be 
to the demand cues and to demand awareness. This has led to a 
discussion of~ motivation in response to demand characteristics 
and demand awareness. Essentially, three major motives have been 
identified and their existence supported experimentally: 
(a.) Aiding in the achievement of the goals of science by 
cooperating with the.§_ in validating his hypothesis. (Musante 
& Anker, 1972; Orne, 1962, 1973; Page, 1969, 1970; Sherman, 1967; 
Sigall, Aronson & Van Hoose, 1970) 
(b.) A lack of commitment to the experiment on the part of 
the~, leading him to be uncooperative in validating the E's 
hypothesis. (Argyris, 1968; Masling, 1966; Orne, 1973; Page, 
1969; Page & Scheidt, 1971; Sigall, ~~., 1970) 
(c.) Evaluation apprehension, or the desire to hide any 
psychological weaknesses from the ! by responding in what the S 
perceives to be a psychologically healthy ~anner. (Altemeyer, 
1971; Page & Scheidt, 1971; Silverman & Regula, 1968) 
Although much effort has gone into dealing with responses 
to demand characteristics in terms of motives (especially Silver• 
man & Shulman, 1970), it would appear to be much more effica-
cious to deal with response modes. Borrowing from Orne's (1973) 
conceptualization of two motives, it is suggested that !S use two 
more easily operationalized concepts --- the two response modes 
of ~ooperation and non-cooperation with the .§. in validating his 
hypothesis (evaluation apprehension being subsumed under both 
cooperation and non-cooperation). 
The uncritical use of deception in psychological experiments 
has been roundly decried (Kelman, 1969; Orne, 1973, Stricker, 
2 
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Messick & Jackson, 1969), and has n direct bearing on a ~'s 
p~rception of demand characteristics. The objective of the use 
of deception is essentially to prevent the S from accurately 
perceiving the demand characteristics or becoming demand aware 
during the experiment ~hat Orne (1973)· calls a quasi-control. 
However, when a deception is poorly performed, is too transparent 
or when a S has been previously deceived in an experiment, this 
quasi-control may not perform its function. S suspicion is 
likely to be aroused, and this in turn will lead to an increase 
in extraneous variation (Stricker,~ 2_!., 1969). It is 
important to here note that demand awareness is not necessarily 
the same as suspicion of deception, in that in some deception 
experiments a S can be demand aware but not suspicious that he 
is being deceived (Page & Scheidt, 1971). ~-
Directly related to~ suspicion and demand awareness is the 
problem of~ naivete. Page (1968, 1970) has demonstrated that 
different results are obtained from sophisticated and naive ~s, 
and these results are directly related to the S's ability to 
pick up demand cues and become demand aware. Further complicating 
I 
this problem is the fact that many Ss who would be considered 
naive (no courses in psychology or introductory psychology 
student) are in fact fairly sophisticated. Silverman & Regula 
(1968) found that many of their ~s, who had only had several 
weeks of an introductory psychology course, were constructing 
highly sophisticated hypotheses for the experiment in which they 
participated. Page & Scheidt (1971) found that ~s who had never 
had a psychology course were highly sophisticated in creating 
experimental hypotheses. 
Numerous discussions have either stated or inferred the 
importance of interpersonal trust to the psychological experi-
ment 1 s social setting (Kee & Knox, 1970; Milgram, 1965; 
Nottingham, 1972; Orne, 1973; Rotter, 1971; Sherman, 1967; 
Stricker, et al., 1969). Rotter conceptualizes trust as a 
generalized expectancy "held by an individual or a group that 
the word, premise, verbal or written statement of another indi-
vidual or group can be relied upon" (1967, p. 651). The implica-
tion of this definition is that communications must be explicit, 
but this definition must be expanded to include the fact that 
communications may also be implicit (Schlenker, Helm & Tedeschi, 
1973). This is especially true of the exptrimental situation, in 
which there is the implicit understanding that no harm will come 
to the~ (Orne, 1973). Milgram (1965), for example, found that 
one of the reasons his ~s continued to obey the E and shock 
another individual, was their belief that no E would allow them 
to seriously harm another person. 
Orne (1962, 1973) delineated the experimental problems 
which he has focused on as the role expectations brought into the 
experimental situations by both the S and the E. If we accept 
Rotter's (1967) definition of trust (with the Schlenker, ~ !!.!:.·• 
1973 amend~ent) it seems to follow that some aspect of role 
expectation will involve interpersonal trust~ Also, it would 
appear to follow, .!!. priori, that interpersonal trust would have 
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some bearing on the effectiveness of a deception used in an 
experiment, and would in some manner interact with S naivete in 
determining how or whether the §_ perceives the demand character-
istics of, or becomes demand aware during an experiment. To 
better conceptualize these relationships one might view them as 
involving the interaction of the experimental situation with both 
the S's level of trust and his level of naivete (or degree of 
sophistication) about psychological experiments. The interaction 
of these three variables will affect the §_ 1 s perception of the 
demand characteristics of the experiment, and this perception may 
or may not lead to the §_ becoming demand aware. 
We may define the relationship between trust and naivete in 
terms of Rotter's (1971) theory that the more novel and ambiguous 
a situation is, the greater weight generalized expectancies will 
have. If a S is naive, the experimental situation in which he 
finds himself is novel and more ambiguous; hence, the trust 
variable should have a significant effect on his behavior. If, 
however, the S has knowledge of what to expect in the experimen-
tal situation, the effect of the trust variable should be 
nullified. 
Suspicion may be seen in some cases as being aroused by the 
demand characteristics of an experiment, given that the S has not 
been briefed by a former S about the purpose of the experiment. 
The demand cues may be conveying the message that "You are not 
supposed to know what I'm really trying to do," and this message, 
in turn, may cause the S to search more actively for other demand 
5 
cues. One suggestion to remove most of the possibility of ~ 
suspicion from the experiment is to give an honest explanation 
of the purpose of the experiment, but this only increases the 
probability of the E_ becoming demand aware. Another problem with 
this solution is the fact that sometimes the deceptive explana-
tion may appear to the S to be the more plausible explanation 
(Orne, 1973). 
The present experiment was designed to study the effect of 
the variables of ~naivete, the use of deception, and level of 
trust on a E_'s ability to become demand aware, and took the form 
of a study of the effect of racial attitudes upon the evaluation 
of a communication. There were three sets of conditions manipu-
lated in a 2 x 2 x 3 design. Ss were divided into high and low 
levels of trust, then placed in either nai•e or non-naive condi-
tions of knowledge about the use of deception in psychological 
experiments, and finally placed in one of three experimental 
explanation conditions (none, honest, or deceptive). 
It was hypothesized that there would be a three way inter-
action among the variables; that is, high and low trust would 
differentially affect demand awareness and suspicion depending 
on the level of naivete {knowledge) about psychological exper-
mentation, and on the type of explanation given {none, honest, 
deceptive) as to the purpose of the experiment. Specifically: 
(1.) In the naive, no experimental explanation condition, 
low trust Ss would show significantly greater suspicion and 
demand awareness than would high trust ~s. 
6 
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(2.) In the naive, honest explanation condition the low 
trust Ss would show significantly greater suspicion than would 
the high trust ~s, but there would be no difference in demand 
awareness due to the fact that the high trust Ss would accept the 
honest explanation at face value, and be prepared to pick up the 
demand cues. 
(3.) In all non-naive conditions high and low trust Ss 
would not differ significantly in suspicion and demand awareness. 
(4.) There would be a significant positive relationship 
between measures of suspicion and of demand awareness. 
Method 
Subjects. The ~s were 60 (31 male, 29 female) undergraduate, 
introductory psychology students at the University of Richmond. 
Introductory classes in psychology were given the Rotter Inter-
personal Trust Scale (1967), the Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 
1959), and a modified form of the Negro Prejudice Scale (Westie, 
1953; see Appendix A). The three scales were administered by the 
E in the first week of classes. In order to prevent E bias, an 
associate of the E's selected, from the 218 persons tested, 30 
Ss from the top 15% and 30 ~s from the bottom 15% of the scores 
on the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale (X = 69.09; s = 7.84; see 
Appendix A). At no time during the experiment did the E know who 
was in the high or low trust conditions. The same associate of 
the E randomly assigned the Ss to the other two treatment condi-
- -
tions. Ss were then run through the experiment individually. 
Apparatus. A tape recorder and one tape were used. The tape 
contained two prerecorded messages. 
Procedure. Just prior to being run in the experiment, the Ss who 
had been previously randomly assigned to the non-naive condition 
(15 high and 15 low trust) had read to them, as they read to 
themselves, a printed statement designed to sensitize them to, 
or make them aware of the possible use of deception in psycholog-
ical experiments (see Appendix B). The statement was presented 
to the Ss as a statement of experimental ethics, and they were 
told that all !s at the university were required to present such 
a statement to their §_s. The remaining 30 Ss in the naive 
condition did not receive this statement. 
Again from the previous random selection, 20 §_s (10 high and 
10 low trust) were then placed in each of )hree conditions. One 
group was given a deceptive explanation of the purpose of the 
experiment; they were told that the experiment was designed to 
test their ability to listen to and learn spoken material. A 
second group was told the "true" purpose of the experiment; it 
was the study of the effect of racial attitudes on evaluation of 
a communication. The third group was given no explanation of the 
purpose of the experiment. Any §. in this third group who in-
quired about the purpose of the experiment was told that there 
would be a feedback session after all Ss had been run, at which 
time the experiment would be explained and all of his/her 
questions would be answered. (See Appendix B for explanation 
transcripts.) 
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Following these treatments the ~s listened to two different 
tape recorded messages, each favoring racial integration (see 
Appendix B for message transcripts) 0 Both messages were read by 
males, one with a Northern accent and one with an Afro-American 
accent. Immediately following each message presentation, the _[s 
were given a brief comprehension test on the material which they 
had just heard, and asked to rate the messages, on a five point 
scale, for clarity of ideas, content, logicality, vocabulary used, 
overall effectiveness and whether they agreed or disagreed with 
the message. (See Appendix B for comprehension tests and rating 
scales.) 
When the second comprehension test had been completed, the 
E gave the .[ a questionnaire designed to get at demand awareness 
and suspicion. The questionnaire utilize~the funnei technique 
described by Page (1969) and consisted of nine or ten pages 
(depending on whether or not the S had received the ethics state-
ment), with one question per page and space for the S to write 
his answer. (See Appendix B.) 
At the conclusion of the experimental session each S was 
told that there would be a feedback session after all Ss had been 
run, at which time the experiment would be fully explained and 
all questions answered. Ss were asked not to speak to others 
about the experiment until after this feedback session. 
Results 
The questionnaires were scored by two, trained independent 
raters (see Appendix C for instructions and training procedures) 
in a manner similar to that used by Jones (1971). Each question 
was scored for either demand awareness or suspicion, from a one 
for no awareness or suspicion, to a four for maximum awareness 
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or suspicion. Intermediate levels of awareness or suspicion were 
scored either two or three. Individual question scores were then 
sunnned to give each ~ both a total demand awareness score and a 
total suspicion score. Inter-rater reliability (using a Pearson 
.E,) was .88 for total demand awareness scores and a .76 for total 
suspicion scores, indicating a modest amount of reliability for 
both measures. 
Raters also assigned each questionnaire overall scores for 
demand awareness and suspicion. These overall scores were given 
on the basis of considering each questionn~ire in its entirety 
and then assigning one score (of from one to four) for demand 
awareness, and one score (of from one to four) for suspicion. 
This is similar to the scoring method used by Page (1968, 1969, 
1970, 1971, 1973) and Page and Scheidt (1971). As a measure of 
inter-rater reliability, phi coefficients were computed after 
these scores had been dichotomized according to whether the S 
was or was not demand aware or suspicious (scores of 3 & 4, and 
1 & 2 respectively) 0 The phi coefficients for the overall scores 
were quite low and little confidence could be placed in these 
measures (demand awareness: ~=.43/~MAX.=.43; suspicion·: ~=.55/$}1AX= 
.82). 
Because of Page's (1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973) technique 
of having post-experimental questionnaires scored by himself and 
one other independent rater, the present _g_ also rated the 
questionnaires for demand awareness and suspicion. The E corre-
lated {using a Pearson.!) .98 and .79 with raters #1 and #2 
respectively on the total demand awareness. scores, and • 67 and 
.58 on the total suspicion scores. On the overall demand aware-
ness scores the phi coefficient for the E and rater #1 was 
.66/4>MAx=.66, and for the E and rater #2 was .56/~MA,X=.65. The 
overall suspicion scores yielded ~=.53/~MAX=.74 for the,!;_ and 
rater #1, and ~=.42/~.81 for the.§_ and rater #2. {See 
Table 1) 
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Total demand awareness and total suspicion scores for 
individual Ss were each summed across the two raters. These two 
sets of scores were then used in separate ~OVAs. Total demand 
awareness scores yielded non-significant results. The trust 
factor had an F=3.25 {df=l/58, p <.10), while the naivete factor, 
the experimental explanation factor and all interactions had 
F< 1.00. Total suspicion scores also produced non-significant 
results, wit\1 F=2.69 {df=l/58, p (.25) on the trust factor and 
with F(l.00 for the naivete factor, the experimental explanation 
factor and all interactions. {See Tables 2 & 3) 
In order to determine if there was any relationship between 
the total demand awareness and total suspicion scores, a Pearson 
r was performed, resulting in a .6Z correlation. 
Discussion 
In order to see if the overall scores would yield significant 
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TABLE 1 
Inter-rater Reliabilities for Scoring of Post-experimental 
Questionnaires on Measures of Demand Awareness and Suspicion 
Raters 
Measure 111 & 1F2 E & 1fl E & 1fo2 
Total Demand 
Awareness r=.88 r=.98 r=. 79 
Overall Demand ~=.:56/~MAX=o 65 Awareness ~=.43/~MAX=.43 ~=. 66/~MAX=. 66 
Total 
Suspicion r=.76 r=.67 r=.58 
Overall 
Suspicion ~=. 55/~MAX.<82 ~=.53/~~=o 74 ~=. 42/~MAX.=. 81 
TABLE 2 
Results of Analysis of Variance on: 
Total Demand Awareness Scores 
Source of Variation 
Between S 
Trust 
Naivete 
Experimental 
Explanation 
Trust x Naivete 
Trust x Experimental 
Explanation 
Naivete x Experimental 
Explanation 
Trust x Naivete x 
_Experimental Explanation 
SwG 
df SS MS 
1 239.99 239.99 
1 41.66 41.66 
2 50.53 25.27 
1 .62 .62 
2 130.81 65.41 
2 100.14 50.07 
2 2.78 1.39 
48 3545.20 73.86 
13 
F 
3.25 
less than 1.00 
" 
II 
" 
" 
II II 
II 
" 
II 
.. 
" 
II 
" 
II II 
TABLE 3 
Results of Analysis of Variance on: 
Total Suspicion Scores 
Source of Variation 
Between S 
Trust 
Naivete 
Experimental 
Explanation 
Trust x Naivete 
Trust x Experimental 
Explanation 
Naivete x Experimental 
Explanation 
Trust x Naivete x 
Experimental Explanation 
SwG 
df SS MS 
1 96.26 96.26 
1 32.26 32.26 
2 1.20 .60 
1 1.69 1.69 
2 14.54 ~ . 7. 27 
2 26.14 13.07 
2 59071 29.86 
48 1717 .60 35.78 
14 
F 
2.69 
less than 1.00 
II II 
" 
" 
II II 
" " 
II 
" 
II II 
If If 
" 
results, a post hoc chi square, using the dichotomized overall 
demand awareness scores, was performed on trust by demand aware-
ness. The chi square (using a Yates correction) was run on all 
~s upon whom the raters agreed as to their awareness status 
(N=38), and the results were non-significant (X 2=3.77, df=l, 
p (. lO)o 
The hypotheses set forth for this study predicted a three 
15 
way interaction, which did not come close to appearing for either 
total demand awareness or total suspicion scores (F ( 1.00, 
df=l/48). This, and the fact that for both measures all of the 
other interactions and all main effects, except trust, also had 
F(l.00, appears to indicate that the naivete and experimental 
explanation treatments had no effect on the ~s. It may be that 
anxiety caused by evaluation apprehension ~r distraction caused 
by a lack of interest in participating in the experiment inter-
fered with a S's ability to attend closely to the reading of the 
ethics statement or to the explanation of the purpose of the 
experiment. But lack of attention alone could probably account 
for only the responses of a small number of ~s. 
The ethics statement may have sensitized naive Ss to the 
possible use of deception and to possible lapses in experimental 
ethics --- as it was designed to do. However, knowledge of po-
tential deception does not necessarily make a naive ~ psycholog-
ically sophisticated enough to know how and where to look for a 
deception. It is suggested, therefore, that to make a naive S 
truly non-naive (sophisticated) it would be necessary to present 
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him/her with information about typical experimental paradigms 
used in social psychological experiments. 
There are also some factors which may have rendered the ex-
perimental explanation treatments ineffective. Perhaps the de-
ception used was not elaborate enough to distinguish between the 
effects of high and low trust. The demand characteristics of the 
experiment pointing toward the involvement of racial attitudes 
may have been so blatant that few, if any, Ss could accept the 
deceptive statement that it was simply a learning experiment. 
The honest explanation may not have had its expected effect due 
to a lack of explicitness. Perhaps it was necessary to spell out 
more clearly what the study was all about in order to assure that 
the S understood what the E.was trying to do. 
Finally, the impotence of both the na~vete and experimental 
explanation treatments may have been related to the fact that 
the experiment in which the ~s were participating was a contrived, 
"pseudo" experiment. The E was not actually trying to measure 
the effects of racial attitudes, and this may have affected the 
potency of the treatments used. Perhaps if the E had actually 
J 
intended to measure the effects of racial attitudes on the eval-
uation of a communication more potent treatments would have been 
used, and the predicted three way interaction would have appeared. 
The fact that all treatments failed to have a significant 
effect may also be related to a more general difficulty, that of 
rater reliability in the scoring of ~he post-experimental 
questionnaires. 
In the process of scoring the questionnaires it is 
necessary for the raters to place an interpretation upon what 
the Ss are trying to state (Page, personal communication). This 
is necessitated by the fact that the ~s vary in their ability to 
express themselves clearly and are not familiar with the use of 
psychological jargon. This need for interpretation allows 
subjectivity to enter into what ideally should be an objective 
process. Therefore, it is necessary for the E!_ in training the 
raters to communicate somehow a single interpretive set to the 
raters, and thereby assure more reliable scoring. This may be 
a hit or miss process, as is suggested by the E's correlating 
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.98 and .79 with each rater on total demand awareness scores, and 
correlating • 66 and .56 on the overall demand awareness scores. 
Another contributing factor to these ~odest to poor inter-
rater reliabilities may have been the post-experimental question-
naire itself. The questionnaire used Page's (1969, 1970, 1971, 
1973) and Page and Scheidt's (1971) "funnel" structure. Questions, 
patterned after those used by Page and Scheidt (1971), were con-
structed on the basis of the E!_'s own perceptions of what were the 
salient demand characteristics of the experiment. Page (1973), 
however, suggests that detailed oral interviews be used in the 
pilot stage of the experiment, and that the experience from these 
interviews be used in constructing questions which will be most 
effective in getting a ~ demand awareness. The questions used in 
the present study's questionnaire also may not have been specific 
enough in some instances to "elicit reports that are concrete and 
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detailed enough so that a scorer c~m interpret what is being said" 
(Page, 1973, p. 321). 
Regardless of the adequacy of the questionnaire used, the 
need for interpretation of what a S is trying to state still 
allows subjectivity to enter into the questionnaire scoring pro-
cedure. This has serious ramifications in terms of replication 
and further experimentation. The interpretive set used by one E 
may not (probably will not) be the same as that used by another 
~' even though both follow the same rating instructions. This 
may make replication a near impossibility unless the variables 
under consideration exert a powerful effect or the experiment 
does not involve a complex interaction of treatment effects 
which Ss must describe in order to be considered demand aware. 
Page's work (1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973)~has dealt chiefly with 
the classical conditioning of attitudes and verbal conditioning, 
both of which involve a minimum of interpretation of ~ state-
ments on demand awareness questionnaires. They involve relatively 
clear-cut contingencies and lack complex interactions among treat-
ments. It was felt that the present experiment was also relative-
ly uncomplicated and yet the modest to poor rater reliabilities 
do not jibe with the high reliability coefficients reported in 
Page's (1969, 1970, 1971, 1973) work. 
Page (1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973) scores the post-experi-
mental questionnaires along with one other independent rater. 
Page (personal communication) trains this rater very thoroughly 
giving him/her experience in rating and in the experimental 
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situation --- in order to assure high rater reliability coeffi-
cients. This training, in which he must communicate his own 
interpretive set to the other rater, may very well be a biasing 
factor --- who is to say that the E:, 1 s interpretive set does 
indeed actually discriminate between those Ss who are or are not 
demand aware? Perhaps impressive results obtained would fall 
apart if those questionnaires which required the most interpreta-
tion on the part of the raters were scored by raters placing a 
more conservative or a more liberal interpretation on what the 
~s stated. Because of Page•s (1969, 1970, 1971, 1973) reported 
high rater reliability coefficients, the present E chose to 
combine his scores with those of rater #1, with whom he correlated 
.98 on the total demand awareness measure. The ANOVA resulted 
in a pattern of F ratios similar to that of the ANOVA run on the 
scores of the two independent raters (i.e. all interactions and 
main effects, except trust, having F(l.OO)o However, in the 
ANOVA on the E's and rater #l's scores, the trust effect, instead 
of merely approaching significance, was found to be significant 
(F=4.l~, df=l/58, p (.05). Following this up further, it was 
decided to run separate ANOVAs on each rater's total demand aware-
ness scores in order to discover if their individual results were 
consistent with the other results reported above. Rater #l's 
results showed a significant trust effect (F=5.45, df=l/58, 
p (.05), while all other main effects and interactions had 
F(l.00. Rater #Z's results had no significant effects (see 
Tables 4, 5, and 6). Taking these results into consideration, 
TABLE 4 
Results of Analysis of Variance Performed on: 
Total Demand Awareness Scores of E and Rater #1 
Source of Variation 
Between S 
Trust 
Naivete 
Experimental 
Explanation 
Trust x Naivete 
Trust x Experimental 
Explanation 
Naivete x Experimental 
Explanation 
Trust x Naivete x 
Experimental Explanation 
SwG 
* df=l/58, p ( .05 
df 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
48 
SS MS 
453.74 '•53. 74 
3.74 3.74 less 
133.23 66.62 II 
25.38 25.38 II 
99.11 49.56 II 
103.91 51.96 II 
47.47 23.74 " 
5299.60 110.41 
20 
F 
4.11 •k 
than 1.00 
" 
II 
II II 
II 
" 
" 
II 
II II 
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TABLE 5 
Results of Analysis of Variance Performed on: 
Total Demand Awareness of Rater #1 
Source of Variation 
Between S 
Trust 
Naivete 
Experimental 
Explanation 
Trust x Naivete 
Trust x Experimental 
Explanation 
Naivete x Experimental 
Explanation 
Trust x Naivete x 
Experimental Explanation 
SwG 
* df=l/58, p < .05 
df SS MS 
1 96.26 96.26 
1 3.26 3.26 
2 4.93 2.47 
1 1.69 1.69 
2 38.94 '19.47 
2 Zl.74 10.87 
2 2.51 1.26 
48 847.60 17.66 
F 
5.45 
* 
less than 1.00 
II II 
" 
II II II 
II II II 
" " 
II 
" 
II II 
TABLE 6 
Results of Analysis of Variance Performed on: 
Total Demand Awareness Scores of Rater #2 
Source of Variation 
Between S 
Trust 
Naivete 
Experimental 
Explanation 
Trust x Naivete 
Trust x Experimental 
Explanation 
Naivete x Experimental 
df SS MS 
1 32.26 32.26 
1 21.59 21.59 
2 24.13 12.07 less 
1 4.29 4.29 II 
2 34.54 17.27 
F 
1.88 
1.26 
than 
II 
1.01 
22 
1.00 
II 
Explanation 2 29.21 14.61 less than 1.00 
Trust x Naivete x 
Experimental Explanation 2 4.91 2.46 " II If 
SwG 48 824.00 17.17 
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we must again ask the question of who had the correct interpreta-
tion of ~s' statements on the post-experimental questionnaires. 
Perhaps rater #Z's interpretation was the more correct. Perhaps 
neither interpretive set was correct. If this was indeed the 
case then the results of this study could be merely experimental 
artifacts. 
It appears that the post-experimental questionnaire is the 
most practical method of detecting demand awareness, yet one 
must have some indication of how accurate one's interpretation of 
Ss' statements is in reflecting reality. An experimental para-
digm which might help bolster confidence in our interpretations 
might be an experiment consisting of two distinct sections. The 
second section of the experiment would be identical to the first, 
except that one of the demand characterist~cs (perhaps a treat-
ment variable) would be changed. The post-experimental question-
naire, administered after the completion of both sections, would 
be divided into two parts and treat each section as though it 
were an entirely separate experiment. In this manner we would 
be obtaining a second ~ report which might help clarify his/her 
understanding of the experimental hypotheses involved. 
All the previous discussion has dealt chiefly with demand 
awareness measures. Regarding the suspicion measures we must 
conclude that there is little indication that suspicion need be 
investigated any further at the present time. The hypothesis 
·that there would be a significant positive relationship between 
suspicion and trust measures was partially born out by the 
24 
Pearson r of .62 for the total demand awareness and total 
suspicion scores. The correlation was significantly different 
in a positive direction from .OO, but only 38 percent of the 
variance was explained by the relationship between the two 
measures 
2 . (r =.38). This relationship between the scores, plus 
the fact that suspicion was partly defined in terms of S state-
ments of awareness of particular demand characteristics, brings 
into question the independence of the suspicion measures from the 
demand awareness measures. Without the independence of the 
suspicion measures not too much can be inferred from their results. 
A great deal of subjectivity also entered into the suspicion 
measures. This was due mainly to the fact that suspicion was 
defined in terms not only of §_ statements concerning awareness 
of demand characteristics, but also in terms of statements con-
cerning other aspects of the experiment which §_s may have per-
ceived as important (such as the locked testing room, the possible 
disclosure of information about onself, etc.). This latter part 
of the definition allowed a great deal of subjectivity to enter 
into the scoring, as is suggested by the low inter-rater relia-
bilities (see Table 1). The difficulty in defining suspicion 
also led a number of §_s to state that the use of the term 
"suspicion" was ambiguous. They felt that they were not neces-
sari~y "suspicious" about certain aspects of the experiment, but 
merely "curious .. " 
Finally, taking an overview of the entire experiment it 
must be concluded that few firm conclusions can be made. The 
results strongly suggest a follow-up study of the rclationahip 
between demand awareness and trust, in order to discover if 
trust does indeed have any effect on a ~'s ability to become 
demand aware. This follow-up study would hopefully remove some 
of the difficulties in the construction and scoring of the post-
experimental questionnaire. Further, it appears that the 
suspicion measures used in the present experiment are open to 
question. They require better definition in order to make them 
independent of the demand awareness measures, and in order to 
make the scoring of suspicion questions more objective. 
Appendix A 
Pre-experimental questionnaire given to introductory 
psychology classes, consisting of: 
I. Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale (1967) 
II. Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1959) 
26 
III. Modified form of the Negro Prejudice Scale (Westie, 1953) 
Frequency distribution of Rotter Interpersonal Trust 
Inventory scores. 
IDENTIFIGATIOll NUMBER:; 051 
NAME: 
(last) (.first 
SCHOOL OR LOCAL PHONE NUT1IBER: 
SCHOOL YEAR (circle one): FRS~I SOPH IR SR 
INTRO. PSYCH. PROFESSOR: 
SEX: M 
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NUMBER: 
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GENERAL OPINION SURVEY 
This is a questionnaire to determine the attitudes. and beliefs 
of different people on a variety of ffljatements. Please answer the 
statements by giving as true a pictura of your own beliefs as pos-
sible.. Be sure to read each item carefu~ly and show your beliefs 
by marking the appropriate number on you:r- answer sheet. 
If you stronr:;ly agree with an item, fill in the space num-
bered one. Mark the suace numbered two if you mildly agree with 
the item. That is, mark number two if you think the· item is gen-
erally more true than untrue according to your beliefs. Fill in 
the space numbered three if you fe·el that the i tern is about 
equally true as untrue. Fill in the space numbered four if you 
mildly disagree with the item. That.is, mark number ·four if you 
feel the item is more untrue than true. If you strongly disagree 
with an i tern' fill in the space numbered five e . 
1. Strongly agree 
2:. Mildly agree 
3. Agree and disagree:- equally 
4. Mildly disagree 
5. Strongly disagree 
Please be sure to fill. in the space.s completely and t;o erase 
completely any marks to be changed. Make no extra marks on either 
the answe~ sheet or the questionnaire. 
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-2-
]. Strongly agree 2. Mildly agree 3. Agr.ee and disagree equally 
4. Mildly ~isagree 5. Strongly disag~ee 
1. Most' people would rather live i~ a- climate. that is mild 
all year around than in one in which winters ar~ cold. 
2. Hypocrisy is on the. -increase in our society. 
3. In dealing with str~ngers one is :better off. to- be· cautious 
until they'have provided evidence that they are trustworthy. 
*'· ·This c.ountry has a dark future. unless we can attract 
bettrer people into politics. 
5. ·Fear of social disgrace or punis.hment rather than con-
science. ·prevents most people fr.om breaking.· the law. 
6. Parents usually can be relied upon ·to·keep their promises_ 
71 •. The. advice. of. elders is of.ten poor ·because the older 
person doesn't recognize. how times have changed. 
8. Using the: Honor. System of not having a teacher present 
during exams -would probably result in increased cheating. 
9. The United Nations will never be a~ ef.fective force in 
keeping world peace. 
10. Parents and teachers are- likely· to say what -they believe 
themselves and not just what they think i~ good for the 
child to hear. 
11!. Most pe.ople. can be counted on.to do what they say they 
will do. 
L2. As evidenced by recent books. and movies morality_ seems 
on the. dovmgra:de in this country. 
., . 
'.- . 
13. The judiciary is a place where we can all get.unbiased· 
. tr.ea tment. · 
14. It is safe. to belie~e t~at in spit~ of w~at people say, 
most people are primarily interested in their ovm welfare. 
15. The future. seems very promising. 
16. Most people would be ho:r:-rif~ed if they knew how much news 
the public hears and sees is distorted. 
17. Saeking advice from several people is more. likely to con--
ruse than it is to help one. 
I. 31 
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l. Strongly agree 2. Mildly ar.ree 3 •. Agree and· disagree equally 
4.. Mildly disagree. 5. Strongly disagree 
18. Most elected public o.fficials c.::-e really s::Lncere in 
their campaign promises •. 
19. There is no simnle wav of deciding who is.telling the 
truth~· 
•. l : 
20. This country has progressed to· the point where we can 
reduce the amount o.f competitiveness encouraged by schools· 
and parents. · 
21. Even though we have reports in newspapers, radio and 
television, it is hard to get objective ·accounts of public 
evants. 
' r 
22.. It is more: 'J.mportant that pe.ople achieve happiness than 
that they achieve greatness. · · · · · 
23. Most experts can be relied upon to teli" the truth about; 
the limits of :their knowledge •. 
' . . - . 
24. Most parents can ·be reli.e:d ui:'~n to carry·· out their. threats 
o.f: punishment. 
25. One should not; attack the political beliefs of other 
people. 
26. In these competitive: times o~e has to be alert or some-
one is likely to take advantage of you. 
27. Children need. to be{ .given more.. guidance: by t.eachers and 
parents than they now typically get. 
2:8. Most rumors usually have a strong element of truth. 
29. Many major:- national sports contests are .fi:x:ed in one way 
or another. 
30. A good leader molds the opinions of the group h~ is 
leading rather than merely .following the wishes of the· 
majority. 
31. Most idealists ara sincere and usually practice what 
they preach. 
32. Most salesmen arahonest in de:scribing their products. 
33. Education in this country is not really preparing young 
men and women to deal with the, problems o.:f the .future. 
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1. Str.ongly agree - 2. Mildly· ~gree 3. Agree and disagree. equally 
~. Mildly disagree 5o Strongly disagree 
------------------------------------------------------~----------
34. Most students in school.would not cheat even if. they 
were sure of getting away with i"i~.~ 
35~ Th·~:· liord~s of' s.tti.a.'ents ·riow- goin·@;.~ -t.o co11ege are. goi~g 
to find it more difficult to find good jobs when they grad-
uate than did the college graduates· of. the. past. -
36~ ·Most ·repairmen will not overcharge ·everi. if they think 
you are ignorant of their speciality. · : · 
3_7 • .A..- iarge :share· -of accident claims . .£iled ag_ainst insurance 
companies are phony. · 
38. One· should not attack the religious beliefs o:f .other 
people. 
39. ·Most ;>eople answer publi.c .. opinion polls honestly~· 
. . . ~ 
40. I.f. w.e really knew what·. was· ·g·oing on in international. 
politics, the- public would have. more reason. :to. be_ fright-
ened than they now seem to be. 
·, 
PLEA.SE· GO ON 
._, - . 
SURVEY CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE 
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II. 
5. 
INSTRUCTIONS: In this portion of the opinion survey, please 
indicate what type of relcitionship~ you wc:mld be. w:i)~ling to 
enter into with members of the various groups listed:by: 
1. Putting an X under each group in as many of the rows 
as your feelings dictate. 
. .. 
2. Remember to give your first feeling reactions in 
every case. 
3. Give your reactions to each group as a grouE~ Do not 
give your reactions· to the best or to the worst members 
that you have known, but think of the picture or stereo-
type that you have of the whole group. · · 
Category 
1. To close kinship·· 
by ·marriage. 
2. To my-·club ·as 
personal chums. 
3. To my street as 
neighbors. 
4 .• To employment in 
my occupation. 
.5. To citizenship 
in my country. 
6. As visitors only 
to my country. 
7. Would exclude 
from my country. 
Indians, 
English Chinese Native Americans Swedes 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
Category 
1. To close kinship 
by marriage. 
2. To my club as 
personal chums. 
3. To my street as 
neighbors •. ~ . : 
~. To employment· in 
my occupation. 
II. 
6. 
Indians, 
Negroes French Japanese (~rom India) 
34 
______________________________ :....:__ _ _._-:___-·· 
5. To citizenship 
·in my country. 
&. As visitors only. 
to my country. 
7'. Would exclude: 
fr.om my countryo 
PLEASE GO ON 
SURVEY CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE 
... 
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III. 
7. 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate all the i terns with \·1hich you agree 
by placing an X to the left of each numb~red item. Na~k as 
many of the numbered items as your feelings dictate. ~einem­
ber to give your first feelinR reactions in-every case. 
--------------------------------------------------~--------------
I believe I would be willing tro have a Negro banker ••••• 
1. live in the same apartment building I live in. 
2. llve across the street from me. 
3. live in my neighborhood .. 
4.. live in my end of town. 
5o live in my town. 
6. live in my country. 
~ 
I believe that I would be willing to have a white ditch-digger •••• 
1. as President of the United States. 
. . - . -
2. as UoSo Congressman from rriy district. 
. . . 
:;. as a councilman on my city's council. 
4. as head of the local community chest drive. 
5 .. a~ a member of a Red Cross Committee in my town. 
6. as a member of a· national patriotic organization. 
CONTif..Tfil:D ON NEXT PAGE 
8. 
I believe I would be willing to have a white banker •••• 
1. use the same towel that I use. 
-
2. swim in the. same pool as I do. 
III. 
3. have h~s hair cut by the· same barber who cuts mine. 
. . 
4. try on clothe·s -at ... the-store -wh-ere:: I buy my clothes. 
__ 5. ride in a crowded-·elevator I a·m in. 
6. use fending library books ~ _a;lso borrowo 
. . . 
~ -· .. -. 
I believe I would be.willing-to have a Negro ditch~digger •••• 
1. as a close personal friend. 
2. as a dinner guest in my home. 
3. as a person I might often visit with. 
4. as an acquaintance. 
5. as someone I might say hello iio. · 
6. as someone I mi~ht see on the street. 
. .. 
I beli ve I would be. willing to have a white. banker •••• 
1. as President of the United States. 
' 
2. as UoS. Congressman from my district. 
/- · ... 
3. as a councilman on my city's council. 
4. as head of the local· community chest drive. 
5. as a member of a Red Cross Committee in my town. 
6. as a member of a national patriotic organization. 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
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III. 
9. 
I believe- I would be willing to have a Negro ditch-digger •••• 
1. use the same towel that I use. 
2. swim in the same pool as I do. 
3. have his hair cut by the same barber who cuts mine. 
4. try. on clothes at the store wpe·re I buy my clothes. 
5. ride in a crowded elevator I am in. 
6. use lending library books I also borrow. 
I believe I would be willing to have a Negro banker •••• 
1. as a ciose personal friend. 
.2. as a dinner guest in my .home, 
3. as a person I might often visit with. 
4. as an acquaintance. 
5. as someone I might say hello to. 
6. as someone I might sea on the street. 
I believe I would be willing to have-a white ditch-digger •••• 
1. live ·in the same apartment building I live in. 
2. live across the street .from me. 
3. live in my neighborhood. 
4. live in my end of town. 
5. live in my tm·m. 
6. live in my country. 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
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10. 
I believe I would be willing to hava a_Negro.banker.oe•. 
1. use the same.towel that I use. 
2. swim in the same pool as I do. 
3. have his hair cut by th~ same ~arber who cuts mineo 
4. try on clothes at the store where I buy my clothes. 
5. ride in a crawdad elevator I ?-ID in. 
6. use lending library books I also borrow. 
I believe I would be willing .. to· have_ a white dittch-digger •••• 
1. as a close personal friend. 
--
2. as a dinner guest in my~homE;:!e 
. 3. as a person I might often visi~ with. 
--
4. as an acquaintance. 
5. as someone I might· say hello to. 
6 ... as someone I might see on the street. 
T "1elie.ve I would be willing to-have a white banker~ ••• 
l. live in the same apartment building· I live in .. 
I 
2. live across the street from me. 
3. live. in my neighborhood. 
4.. live in my end of town. 
5. live. in my town. 
e:.. 1; "ITC> in my country. 
. . 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
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III. 
I believe I would be willing to have a Negro ditch-digger •••• 
1. as President of the United States • 
.. 
2. as U.S. Congressman from my district. 
3. as a councilman on my city's council. 
4. as head of the local community chest drive. 
5. as a member of. a Red Cr.ass Committee in· my. t·own: 
6. as a member of a national patriotic organization~· 
I believe I would be willing to have a white banker •••• 
1. as a close personal friend. 
2. as a dinner guest in my home. 
3. as a person I might often visit with. 
4. as an acquaintance. 
5. as someone I might say hello to. 
6. as someone I-might see on the street. 
I believe I would be willing to have a Negro ditch-digger •••• 
l. live: in the same· apartment building I live in. 
2. live across the stre-et from me~ 
3. live in my neighborhood. 
4. live in my end of tovm. 
5. live in my towno 
6. live in my country. 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
12. 
I believe I would be willing to have a Negro banker •••• 
1. as President of the United States. 
2. as U .s .. Congress.man from my district. 
3~ as a councilman on my city's council. 
4. as head of the local community chest drive. 
5. as a member of a Red Cross Committee in my town. 
6. as a member of a national patriotic organization. 
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III. 
I believe I would be willing to have a white ditch-digger •••• 
1. use tha same towel that I use. 
2. swim in the same pool as I do. 
3. have his hair cut by the same barber who cuts mine .• 
4. try on clothes at the store ~here I buy my clothes. 
5. ride in a crowded elevator I am in. 
6. use lending library books I also borrow. 
END OF SURVEY! 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND ASSISTANCE!!!!!!!!!!. 
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Appendix B 
Experimental materials used in experimental session with 
individual ~s. 
I. Ethics statement 
II. Experimental explanations 
III. Tape recorded message transcripts 
IV. Comprehension tests and rating scales 
V. Post-experimental questionnaire 
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I~ 0~~0~ to assure the ~olfa~e of all students partici~ 
0 f: -~t-~ of· Hichmond. to 
' 1 "\'" • _L • ~~ • • ... !I.., J. """' - \. presen~ eacn SUDJec~ wi~n a oriex s~ace~snu re~evan~ to "tl1e 
Btl::.ics \-;hich guide eyecy psychological expm:.·i1-:icntere 
i-:o subj oct shall ba exposed. to arzy situation in \·1hich there 
J.s th~ possibility of ph.t3ical or psycholor;ical harm.. In t;he 
racent past sone experim.r3r~tars have not strictly .follm·1ed this 
guide1in9, forcing raos-t all universities (The University of 
RichmQnd included) to scree;:1 a.11 experimental proposalz to 
D'9ce:ption may be used. in psychological experiments in an 
attempt to study hew an in<li vid:ual would respond in a "real 
wc:rld." situc1.tion, rather ths.n ho~ .. , he l;iOUld respv:!ld in an experi-
r::er.-.tal s:L tu2.tion~ If dec8ption in a~ exueriment~ .. . 
il!:.C?ntal ethics denn.nd. tha-t th.e subject must 'be ini'orned ai:; thG 
conc1··Jsion .:_~:r the oxpcrirr.e:.-it of th9 t;rue n3ture o:r the task-; 
EXPERIMENTAL EXPLANATIONS 
~ - What I would like you to do is listen to this tape 
recording. After you have listened to it you will be asked 
to answer some questions about what you have heard. 
Deceptive - This experiment is a study of how well people can 
listen to and learn spoken material. It has a direct bearing 
on determining how effective a technique public speeches and 
lecturing are in transmitting information. What I would like 
you to do is listen to this tape recording. After you have 
listened to it you will be asked to answer some questions about 
what you have heard. 
Honest - This experiment is a study of how an individual's 
racial attitudes affect his evaluation of a communication. It 
has a direct bearing on determining how a persuasive argument 
can be most effective in changing attitudes. What I would like 
you to do is listen to this tape recording. After you have 
listened to it you will be asked to answer some questions about 
what you have heard. 
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TAPE RECORDED MESSAGES 
I. The great economic wealth and social stability which the 
United States has achieved in the relatively short period of 200 
years, is something we all can be proud of. This great wealth 
and stability is threatened, however, if we do not take action to 
bring about true racial integration_ in our country. The riots in 
Watts and Detroit are only two examples of what may happen on a 
larger scale if any significant portion of our population becomes 
frustrated by discriminatory economic, educational and political 
practices. Through racial integration we will become a stronger, 
more united nation, not having to fear the social chaos which has 
torn through so many South American and colonized African nations. 
It is through racial integration that we can achieve the level of 
social stability which will allow us to retnain a democracy in 
the face of a crumbling world order. 
II. In an integrated community there would never have to be 
forced school busing. Children would go to neighborhood schools 
and receive an equal education. Money spent on the buses, the 
fuel for the buses and the government to organize and run the 
busing program could be spent on improving the educational system. 
In a racially integrated community adults would learn that living 
with all people presents the same joys and problems, no matter 
what their color may be. If we are willing to make the moral 
commitment and take action in such areas as open housing and 
equality of job opportunity, the integrated community will begin 
to emerge, and we can begin to put the energy and money used for 
busing into some other constructive program. Integration makes 
good economic sense. 
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(lo) Hm·: lcn2 f!ClS it t;;:.kr>n. t:he u .. .-:Q to c:;.chi~ve its \·IE'i'1lth r~nd 
nteb-k 1.i ty? 
( 2 '\ 
' ·:I 
( 3.,) 
( ' '\ <1~; n ~hort period of tiGe 
·.::'lat cot:ntry hu.s suffered from soc!.al chaos'! 
Japan 
• -J,... • ......, • 
l':l.0vS in i..D1.S 
(a~) ec0nc:dc dest:r:L:1ir:c.tion 
(a.'!>) political aesc:.."ini:.1!3..tion 
\·Jhy . do He need c:;. raciflll~/ intc:sTa tcj, Eocicty? 
(a~) to increasa our ?conoraic Benlth 
(b..,) to maintain our ~)resent level of social stability 
Ceo) to aid in the co:·~~truction of a nm·1 world order 
(do) to incrensc our pttcsent 1-'.;vel Qf socia:. stability 
( 50 ) ~.lho.t t~i.io .riots were r.;er.tioned by the spenkc .•? 
( ao) Detroit & ~:a tts 
(d~) Newark ~ Datroit 
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Glnrity of Ideas =-~ 
Poor Excellent 
Gonte.n t c.4 • ... ~ 
Poor n • • O 
_1_ "~ •--o~ o -.:::--. 2 j 4 ;,J 
.;:;xcellent 
Lor;icality 
Poer • • e • 
-r 0-r. -~ .. ,_ "--s- Excellent 
Vocabulary Us~d --= 
B::cccJ.lent 0 0 • • 
-;-"-rr-.. -r"-2--"-:r Poor 
Overall Ef.i:'Bctiveness ··--
Excellent ~ G 4 v ~·4-"-;-";r"-r Poor 
.Please rate the ocssagc based on how much you agreed or disngTaed 
uith ito 
Disav:ce 
.t:ntirely 
Asree 
Entirely 
1.'he fcllc~-·in;::; :::_ncstions s.re: ::!·:)cu-~ tl12 :-:icss:ic;e 1:1-1-lC;l you L:tve 
j~1:---t :1:·a~do ! 1-J~ .:e zJ.r:::\·.'cr :1~~~~~ -':.-)' c ircli:-i.; t~l.G l·::~.t(;~ on ::lot~r 
t~r~:~~\:c:r :3!1oet \-.~:~.Lc11 ccr~csr.:J::C.~ ·.:i .. ~[1 t::-~s rcs~c:J..:;e lfo11 feel })c.:·.t; 
tt112.•.,.1crs ti:.c ql1c:;ti.cn~ 
( 10) ':!hat conc:::--.::tc nctio~ '.·.'2s .:-;u.~;:;r:;::;tcd to b:rinG about !.'Ctcicl 
inteG'.cntion? 
(a~) equal cduceticr.':l o-;;;;or-:u:-ii ties 
( . "\ Oo) 
(c~) open ho9Gins 
(d~) more job opport~ities 
(2o) ':!hnt 
(a.::i) t!;.e conrauni ty '.:ill benefit f'ina.'1.cially from rD.cinl 
inte{;ration., 
(bo) bussing is an i:ieffective !:4"1.d '>mstaful prograc 
(ce) ncichborhood scI'-ools and equal education go toEothcr 
(d~) all people are alike in many uays? ~agardless o~ color 
(3o) To \·:ha.t oajor political p::-oblera \-Ja.s the spca.l~er su~~gestine 
a solution? 
(a.) nei;hborhood schools 
(co) equal educaticn 
(du) effective use of tax monay 
(40 ) · • .:no would benefit c.ost from the learninG experienc0 in 
th0 racially inte[;'!'atcd cor:-.:::uni t"J? 
( a-:i) a.dul ts 
(bo) children 
(do) uoes not state 
-- .. 
( 5~ ) 1,.n., o +._. ·t;:-~~0"" 0"' COfill"".: ·rm -..-.r.' ., ·""-' -' ~ v J.. ••• ..t.. l'.il \..;,. " is necossnry to achieve racir:.l 
integration? 
(ao) a . . .... comml.'Grnenv to net ion 
(bo) a commitment to the 1m·1S of the nation 
(c~) a cor1mi t::nent to equal education 
(d~) D. cor.uni tmen'G to lm.rs hir;he:c than tho::>e of 
Ple~se rate the messace you heard for: 
Clarity of Ideas ---
Poor 
Content --
Poor 
Logicality ... ._ 
Poor 
Vocabulary Used ~--
i.:xcellent 
. . . . 
-i-. -2-.--,. 4--""-s-
. . . . 
,-·2""·,-·Lr·-s--
.. . . . 
. . . . 
-:r-2 ,--zr? 
. . . . 
-5 ·"-zr·-r·-r~-r-
Ovcrall1~ffectiveness --~ 
.Lxcellent 
J:;xcellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Poor 
Poor 
mo.no 
?lense rnte -Ghe oessage based on how much ;you aGreed or disagreed 
with i·tv 
Disagree 
i:;ntirely 
Agree 
EntirGly 
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NAfiE: 
DATE: 
POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
The experiment proper is now over and this is the post-
experimental questionnaire. In order to determine what the results 
of the experiment actually mean it is very important to find out 
what your thoughts were during the experiment. The only way I 
can think of to find out what your thoughts were is just to have 
you open up and to write down what you thought. I'm interested 
in any ideas you had about the purpose of the experiment and any 
suspicions you may have had about any of the procedures. Keep in 
mind that there are no right or wrong answers at this point. 
What I am interested in is whatever you actually thought during 
the experiment and before this questionnaire was introduced. 
Please answer each question as thoroughly as possible and 
remember that I am interested in what you thought during the 
experiment and before this questionnaire was given to you. 
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l.· Generally, what did you think the experiment was about? 
2. Specifically, what did you think my hypothesis was (i.e. what 
did you think I was looking for, trying to study, etc.)? 
3. During the experiment and before this questionnaire was given, 
what suspicions did you have if any? 
4. If you were suspicious, when did you become suspicious and 
what things made you suspicious? Please answer in detail if 
you haven't already. 
5. (a.) During the experiment did you suspect that the content 
of the.messages you heard was an important part of the 
experiment? 
(b.) If yes, what role did it play in the experiment? 
(c.) If yes, how suspicious were you? (Check point on scale 
which you feel best represents the amount of suspicion you 
had about this part of the experiment.) 
Only Slightly 
Suspicious : : : : : : 
----------
Quite 
Suspicious 
6. '(a.) During the experiment did you suspect that the accents 
of the.different speakers had something to do with the 
experiment? 
(b.) If yes, what role did they play4tin the experiment? 
(c.) If yes, how suspicious were you? 
Only Slightly 
Suspicious . . . . . . . . . . . . 
---------
Q·uite 
Suspicious 
7. (a.) When answering the questionnaires following each 
message you heard, was there any section(s) or question(s) 
which you thought was (were) the most important in proving 
my hypothesis? 
(b.) If yes, .which one(s)? Why was it or why were they 
:important? 
8. During the experiment did you think that the accent of the 
speakers was supposed to have an effect on how you rated each 
of their messages? If yes, how certain were you of this? 
Only Slightly 
Suspicious . . . . . . . . . . . . 
-----------
Quite 
Suspicious· 
9. You answered a questionnaire in class prior to this experiment. 
(a.) What did it measure? 
(b.) What was it used for, and how was it used? 
-
10. Did you have any suspicions about the ethics statement which 
was read to you at the beginning of the experiment? If yes, 
please explain. 
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Appendix C 
Rater training --- Both raters were first run through the 
experiment. Following this they were given the scoring directions 
to read (following pages). Questions were then answered concern-
ing the scoring directions, and each rater was then given three 
sample post-experimental questionnaires to score. The fictitious 
responses on these questionnaires were created by the E. After 
scoring the questionnaires the raters compared their scoring 
to that of the E and discussed exactly why certain responses 
were scored in the manner they were. 
GENERAL SCORING DIRECTIONS 
Demand Awareness - When a S has successfully figured out what 
the E is trying to do in an experiment, i.e. he knows what the 
treatment conditions are, and how they are supposed to affect 
him/her. 
1. Be conservative on rating demand awareness. Don•t attribute 
too much awareness. Don't be sucked in too easily in 
determining that the .§. is demand aware. 
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2. Look for CRITICAL IDEAS. Don't be afraid to put an interpre-
tation on what the S said about the hypotheses, i.e. Ss are 
not psychologically-sophisticated, so they may not use the 
same words to describe what they thought was going on as the 
E uses in his examples of answers (on a following sheet), so 
try to figure out what they mean. _ 
3. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS TO MAINTAIN A BALANCE BETWEEN INTERPRETING 
WHAT S MEANT AND NOT PUTI'ING WORDS INTO HIS M)UTH (i.e. between 
instr~ctions #1 & #2). 
4. When scoring, start with question #1 and go through each 
questionnaire, in its entirety, in serial order. In 
determining scores for later question~ always consider 
responses which have been given to questions preceding them. 
Don't be afraid to look back at responses which have already 
been scored when determining the score for an item. 
5. Scores: 
1 - not demand aware; have not figured out anything about the 
true nature of the experiment. 
2 - have a vague idea of what the experiment was about, but 
don't know how the various treatments were supposed to 
affect them. 
3 - have a fairly good idea of what the experiment was about, 
but only vague or partly correct about how the various 
treatments were supposed to affect them. 
4 - have a good idea of what the experiment was about, and a 
good idea about how the various treatments were supposed 
to affect them. 
6. For unanswered items: 
(a.) Give a score of .!,, UNLESS 
SS 
(b.) The answer to the particular item has been specifically 
stated in the context of one of the previous questions, 
then score on the basis of that response. 
7. (a.) Score items #1, 2, Sb., 6b., 7, 8, & 9 for demand 
awareness, total the scores & place score on sheet 
provided under "Sununed D0 A0 Score." 
(b.) Score items #3, 4, Sa. & c. (combined for one score), 6a. 
& c. (combined for one score) for suspicion, total the 
scorei;; and place score under_"Surnmed Suspicion Score.n 
(c.) Co~sider the entire questionnaire as a whole and give it 
one score (between 1-4) as to whether the S was demand 
aware' and_ enter under. "Overall DOA. Score:-11 
(d.) Consider items #3, 4, Sa. & c., and when appropriate 
item #10, and give one score (between 1-4) as to how 
suspicious the S waS:-and record under "Overall 
Suspicion Score:-" 
NOTE: For scoring overall demand awareness and suspicion see 
attached sheet. Scoring of individual suspicion items for 
the summed suspicion score is based on the overall 
suspicion scoring explanation. (See attached sheet) 
OON 'T PUT ANY MARKS OR SCORES ON D0 A. QUESTIONNAIRES 
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D.A 0 QUESTIONNAIRE ANSWERS 
(1.) ~· - Racial attitudes (prejudice) and how it might 
differentially affect one'. s ratings of similar messages, 
depending on whether the message is delivered by a white or 
by a black person • 
.2...._e!. - An answer similar to the 4 pt. answer which leaves 
out one or two of the salient points, but is obviously 
in the right direction. OR 
Racial attitudes (prejudice) and how it might 
differentially affect one~s comprehension and ratings of 
similar messages. OR 
To see whether one would agree more with a white 
speaker than with a black speaker, depending on one's 
racial attitudes 
~· - Racial prejudice, or similar type response. 
1-..£.!. - Any response that doesn't mention racial prejudice 
at all. 
(2.) ~· - Prejudiced .§. will rate the black lower than the 
white speaker, and/or will rate both messages lower than 
non-prejudiced .§. due to message content • 
• 
3 pt. - An answer similar to the 4 pt. answer which leaves 
out one or two salient points, but is obviously in the right 
direction. OR 
Prejudiced .§. will remember less of what the black 
speaker said and rate the blacks message lower than the 
non-prejudiced S. OR 
Prejudiced .§. will agree less with the black than 
with the white speaker. 
2 pt. - Prejudiced person will comprehend less of what was 
said by the black and more of what was said by the white. 
OR 
Something to the effect that prejudice will affect 
the S in some manner other than what is stated above in 
the 4 and 3 pt. answers • 
..!.__e!. - Any answer which does not in some way include the 
statement that racial prejudice was involved in the hypotheses. 
(3.) See "Suspicion" section under OVERALL SCORING. 
(4.) See "Suspicion" section under OVERALL SCORING. 
(5 & ) See "Suspicion" section under OVERALL SCORING. a. c. _ 
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(Sb.) ~· - Something to the effect that the content of the 
message (racial integration) would affect a person's 
evaluation of it depending on his/her racial attitudes. 
~· - Content of both messages was similar and on a 
controversial subject, so it was difficult to remember 
the material especially for the prejudi.c ed ~· 
1....£!. - Statements which include the fnct that the material 
was on a controversial subject (racial integration). 
1-.£E.. - Any statement not touching on the controversial 
nature of the two messages. 
(6a. & c.) See "Suspicion" section under OVERALL SCORING. 
(6b.) 4 pt. - So~ething to the effect that the race of the 
speaker would affect a person's evaluation of the message, 
depending on his/her racial attitudes. 
l._e!. - An answer similar to the 4 pt. answer which leaves 
out one or two salient points, but is obviously in the 
right direction. OR 
Something to the effect that the speaker's race 
would affect the S's comprehension of the message and 
evaluation of it.- OR -
See if the race of the spe~er would affect how 
much the S agreed or disagreed with the speaker, depending 
on the racial attitudes of the ~· 
2 pt. - Any statement which states that the race of the 
speaker was supposed to have some effect on the ~' other 
than those stated above. 
1 pt. - Any statement which does not include the fact 
that the accents were used to distinguish between the races 
of the two speakers. 
(7 .) 4 pt. - Yes. Ratings most important in terms of seeing what 
affect the race of the speaker and/or content of the message 
had on the ~·s evaluation of the message. 
3 pt. - Yes. Question regarding whether agreed or disagreed 
with the speaker was most important in order to evaluate the 
effect the messages of the two speakers had in changing ~'s 
opinion. 
~· - Statement that both were important (should actually 
state in these or very similar terms) • 
.!.....E.!.· - Statement that 1st part (comprehension) most 
• II II important, or a no as an answer. 
(8.) Give 4 pts. if high certainty (last two spaces on scale 
checked) and if S has shoM1 in.the previous answers 
(especialTY-#6) that he/she knew that evaluation of the 
messages was important. 
(9.) 
Give 3 pts. if high certainty and inferred knowledge of 
importance of evaluation or middle certainty and has 
shown that knew importance of evaluations. 
Give Z pts. if high or middle certainty and has not stated 
or inferred importance of evaluations, or if rates low 
certainty. 
Give 1 pt. no matter what certainty rating if S has not 
shown self to be at all demand aware. 
4 pt. - Racial attitudes, racial prejudice, etc., and 
selection of Ss by obtaining those with high or loW--
prejudice for-the second half of the experiment. 
3 pt. - Racial attitudes, etc., and used to select Ss for 
the second half of the experiment":-
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2 pt. - Racial attitudes, etc., and any other response to b. 
1 pt. - doesn't know either answer. 
OVERALL SCORING 
Demand Awareness 
Points 
1 Absolutely no mention or indication that the S thought 
that racial attitudes were supposed to affect-his/her 
responses (ratings of communications or answering of 
comprehension questions). 
2 Mentions racial attitudes but unclear as to its role in 
the experiment. 
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3 Mentions that prejudice or racial attitudes were 
supposed to affect S's responses on the questionnaires 
answered after each-message, but only infers or is vague 
as to how it was supposed to affect the message 
evaluations. 
4 Indicates that racial attitudes were supposed to affect 
his/her responses on the message evaluation section, 
depending on what his/her racial attitudes were. 
Suspicion 
Points 
1 Absolutely no indication of suspicion. Reports 
consistently that believed everything. 
2 Possible indication of suspicion at some point, but 
unclear because of any combination of vagueness, con-
tradictions, or low suspicion ratings. 
3 Was clearly suspicious at some point, but rates self near 
the middle on suspicion ratings or is vague before the 
more direct questions. 
4 Reports before the direct questions that was suspicious 
about such things as message content, accents, the 
content of the questionnaires, the content of the 
pretest, etc. 
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